What does Nietzsche mean by the phrase “God is dead” as announced by his character of the “Madman” (PN pp.95-6)? (15 points)

Nietzsche’s madman as described as someone walking through the “market place” with a lantern looking for God is an allusion to Diogenes of Sinope (412-332BC). Diogenes was the founder of the School of Cynicism, and is famous for searching for a virtuous man in the market place, and espousing ascetic ideals. The God that Nietzsche refers to is the Christian notion of God because of the prevalence of this religion during his time (and location). Around this God were built meaning in life, and morality. Influential Christian thinkers espoused the idea that pursuing truth would lead to knowledge of God.

By the phrase that “God is dead”, Nietzsche is saying that “the belief in the Christian God has ceased to be believable” [The Portable Nietzsche, Pg. 447]. This statement is spoken from the madman, who is an allusion to Diogenes – a cynic ascetic who persistently, but without success searched for a virtuous man in the marketplace – who symbolized Christian ideals (he personified the ascetic ideal). The symbolism of the madman suggests that Christian ideals can’t find God anymore.

Recall that with the assumption that God existed, a meaning in life and basis for morality were built. Christian morality gave meaning to the ascetic ideal as a means to purify oneself. However, Christian ideals also led followers to pursue truth – truth and reason being the basis of the development of science. Since science undermines the existence of God, but the pursuit of science led one to search for truth, then one can say that God has thrown man into nihilism – the idea that we can’t find value in morality that does not lie in God. New meaning for asceticism or any actions taken on a moral basis must be found.

What was the cause of God’s “death”? (10 points)

At base, the reason for God’s death is “Christian truthfulness”. Nietzsche is saying that from the quest for truth and ability to reason, a body of science developed that could explain the nature of reality without requiring [the Christian] God as the causa prima/causa efficiens/causa sui: “the belief in the Christian God has ceased to be believable” [The Portable Nietzsche, Pg. 447]. Religion killed the God around which it was built.

Put differently, considering the dominance of Christianity in his time (and location), “God” was posited as an explanatory metaphysical principle – an inference to the best explanation to the nature of reality. With the rise and development of exact sciences that decreasingly required invocations of the “God” concept with increasingly more reasonable explanations for the nature of reality, Nietzsche is saying that the concept of “God” as a necessity for explanation became superfluous (even if it is more accurate to say that the concept of “God” was only becoming decreasingly valuable). “We have killed him–you and I” [The Gay Science (section 125)], and in Nietzsche’s words:

““Christian morality itself, the concept of truthfulness taken more and more strictly, the confessional subtlety of the Christian conscience translated and sublimated into the scientific conscience, into intellectual cleanliness at any price.” … All great things bring about their own destruction through an act of self-overcoming. … After Christian truthfulness has drawn one inference after another, it must end by drawing its most striking inference, its inference against itself.” Genealogy of Morals, Pg. 160-161, #27

Why does Nietzsche say that “We have killed him [God] – you and I” (PN p.95); i.e., how, or in what sense, did “we” do this? (5 points)

Taking “we” as a reference to the European society within which he lived, by “We have killed him—you and I”, Nietzsche is saying that the culture turned in on itself: what drove the culture to search for truth (belief in God) was what eventually led them to the devaluation of the reason (God) that the search was first pursued.

Influential Christian thinkers found that “God” explained the nature of reality. Consider:

“Faith (in God) seeks, and understanding (reason) finds” St. Thomas Aquinas

St. Thomas Aquinas said that God gave us a sense of him, and we use the reason he gave us to find who/what God is – attempt to provide proofs of the existence and nature of God. But Nietzsche is saying that it is this “Christian conscience” (of finding truth to understand God) that “sublimated into the scientific conscience”. It is ironic: in attempting to “find” God, we killed it. (Again, it is still controversial whether the current state of science can disprove the existence of God, let alone the state of science in Nietzsche’s time. We can say with certainty that science calls into doubt the religious view of reality.) In short: we killed God by constructing science, reason, empirical measurement. Reason once led us to the ontotheological idea of God, but now undermines belief in God.

Why does Nietzsche have his Madman announce God’s “death” to atheists (i.e., “to those who do not believe in God”)? (10 points)

Nietzsche announces God’s “death” to atheists to illustrate fully the discord in society: God is abandoned and that is accepted (as there are atheists), but all that had been built around belief in God, all of the consequences of assuming God’s existence are seemingly intact:

“In the main, however, this may be said: the event itself is much too great, too distant, too far from the comprehension of the many even for the tidings of it to be thought of as having arrived yet, not to speak of the nothing that many people might know what has really happened here, and what must collapse now that this belief has been undermined-all that was built upon it, leaned on it, grew into it; for example, our whole European morality…” The Portable Nietzsche, Pg 447.

Through the use of atheists, he is pointing out that time is required before society realizes that their moral centre is gone, and that a new basis for morality and meaning of life is required. In particular, that the hand by which we killed God (i.e. science) cannot replace it as it only provides the answers to “how”, but not “why”. (Although, in Dawkins’ The Selfish Gene, game theory as used in a model of explanation for altruistic behaviour at the organism-level seems sufficient to me for understanding why society wouldn’t fall into absolute chaos without a moral compass in God, even if absolute good/evil is still abandoned.) His presumption is that science doesn’t have a say in what is right/wrong, and doesn’t provide an answer to why we exist.

What is the connection between Nietzsche’s idea that “God is dead” and his idea of “nihilism”? (10 points)

Starting from the assumption that God existed, European society built (1) a meaning of life, and (2) morality. Christianity posited a heaven and a hell, and propounded values that gave meaning to (3) Ascetic ideals.

Since science undermines presumption of existence of god, all that relied on that assumption (1, 2, 3 above) is also thrown out. (That is, if they are to be retained, then it would need to be for different reasons, and on a different basis.) If nihilism is Idea that we can’t find value in morality that does not lie in God, then science has thrown society into nihilism. The “highest values” are at once devaluated: god, Truth, Morality, and Divine Justice.

Nietzsche is saying that since it was the concept of God that led to the development of science, then it was God that threw society into nihilism (both active and passive forms).

(This is a paper I wrote for some class or other several many years ago.  I didn’t like it back then, but thought I’d post it anyway.)

What is the essence of science, and what makes it successful? A survey of 20th century history of the philosophy of science will provide a full array of answers to these questions, spanning the spectrum of antirealist opinions, as well as touching on realist opinions. In Theory and Reality, Peter Godfrey-Smith introduces a framework to tackle these questions that consists of what he calls three “rival” perspectives regarding the “success” of science:

1. An Empiricist Approach. Science is an accumulation of knowledge through experience, and the success of science is from the reliance of our ability to refine our observational tools.
2. Mathematics and Science: Science is successful because of its use of mathematical tools and models to understand the world.
3. Social Structure and science: Science is successful because of its social structure which consists of Scientific Societies, Journals for peer review, and Research Programs.

There is so much strength in each of these positions that in his The Trouble with Physics, Lee Smolin looks to Paul Feyerabend’s anarchic abandon for comfort: that there are no general rules or descriptions and there cannot be any general rules of descriptions that define successful scientific practice. Demarcation between what is scientific and what is not cannot happen. This differentiation between what is and what is not science is considered the Problem of Demarcation. As discussed by Karl Popper, the differentiation is a methodological one. As discussed by Kuhn, science evolves in a cyclic fashion through paradigm shifts, so that any such distinction is vague. For Nancy Cartwright, the practice of science is the development of a patchwork of models – both mathematical and not – that need not correspond to reality. According to Cartwright, in fact the laws of physics are never true except in highly idealized situations that never “exist”. This paper will consider the three ‘essences’ of science propounded by these three philosophers with consideration of 20th century physics for a determination of the accuracy of their accounts for the success of science.

Karl Popper’s Conjectures and Refutations

In his paper entitled Conjectures and Refutations, Karl Popper propounds his philosophy of science. For Popper, science is progressive through a continuous cycle of conjectures and refutations based on outcomes of crucial experiments, and his demarcating criterion is his principle of falsifiability. In particular, if a conjecture is such that it can be falsified in principle, i.e. that a crucial experiment can be devised where the outcome would decisively show that conjecture to be “true” or “false”, then it is science. In this sense then, Popper’s science is based on methodology. Although, it is questionable as to whether he believed that complete knowledge was attainable. His philosophy only explicitly stated that scientists only gather conjectures with increasing “corroboration”.
On this view, good scientific practice involves the immediate abandon of “falsified” conjectures. From a practical standpoint, this has neither been practiced, nor is it practicable. Taking a look at 20th century physics, one will find a long list of counterexamples:

Feynmann Double-Slit Experiment.

Although Popper eventually said that a scientist need not abandon a conjecture immediately upon evidence against it, he did not have an unambiguous answer as to how long to wait. In the case of the Feynman Double-Slit Experiment for electrons, the outcome of this experiment shows that sometimes the result of what is considered a ‘crucial experiment’ neither decisively corroborates nor refutes a conjecture. In this experiment, an electron gun double-slit experiment was devised to determine the nature of the electron. If an interference pattern was observed on the screen, then the electron must be a wave. If a regular distribution is observed, then it must be a particle. The results of this experiment were such that even when one electron was “shot” at a time, an interference pattern was observed on the screen. This would imply that it is a wave. However, when the set-up is altered to determine which slit the electron is going through, the interference pattern collapses, and a regular distribution is observed, so as to indicate that electrons are particulate. In this case, the crucial experiment as devised by Feynman was not “decisive”. It did not lead to a clear “refutation” of the particle/wave theory of the nature of the electron.

The Bohr Model of the Atom.

The case of the Bohr model of the atom is an example of a model that is still in use because of its usefulness for calculation, but that has been shown to be false. The Bohr model of the atom consists is akin to the planetary model: a nucleus being ‘orbited’ by electron(s). With the knowledge of the wave-nature of the electron, Louis de Broglie developed a model of the atom with the electron as standing waves that surround the nucleus. However, for consideration of phenomena such as of spectral lines, the Bohr model, although not “true”, is more useful for making calculations. Similar to cases like these are Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation: we learned from Einstein that gravity is not a “force” but a result of the curvature of space due to the presence of matter. In spite of this, Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation as a model is more easily applicable for simple calculations.

The Uncertainty Principle.

Mathematically, this states that the product of the uncertainty in location and the uncertainty in momentum of an object must always be greater than or equal to h/2π (where h=Planck’s Constant). The consequences of the statement are profound. They include: (1) that there are limits to our ability to know what is really going on in the world, (2) there is no such thing as a passive observer. But for the sake of this essay, it is important to mention because Popper’s philosophy of science makes no use of the “Principle”. This principle is not falsifiable in principle: no one has yet determined even a thought experiment that could potentially show this to be false. Yet, it is not abandoned as an example of bad science.

Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions

In The Structure, Thomas Kuhn argued for a paradigmatic view of science: normal science is characterized by consensus and adherence to a paradigm. Science goes through cycles: chaos, normal science, anomaly, crisis, revolutionary science. His primary example is the development of physics from what he calls the Aristotelian paradigm to that of Newtonian mechanics, and finally to the Einsteinian one: there is incommensurability between paradigms, and each paradigm outlines the central beliefs of the scientific community at that period of time within that particular field (in this case, broadly speaking, physics). This was one of the biggest upsets for philosophers of science because, as Imre Lakatos believed, it reduced the practice of science to non-rational judgements.

His philosophy of science was strict, such that only one paradigm could dominate a field at any given time, and that normal science was characterized by consensus within that field, and particularly that it is this consensus that drives the success of science. What about research programs? Twentieth century physics is filled with competing research programs that have propounded what can be considered successful results.

Here are some examples:

Antimatter: Dirac vs. Feynman.

On the existence of anti-matter, both Dirac and Feynman has mathematically equivalent theories, but different models for understanding. Dirac’s model of antimatter appeals to a visualization of a positron as the anti-electron. Feynman’s model does not appeal to the positron as a separate entity from the electron: he views it as an electron moving backward through time. Since they are mathematically equivalent, it is only the interpretations that differ. Why does this matter? Kuhn argued that development and success within a given paradigm required consensus. Here we see competing camps, with similar success. They need not view the world in the same way to build on their models.

Quantum Theory: Heisenberg vs. Schrödinger.

Similar to the comparison between Dirac and Feynman on antimatter, in the 1920’s, Heisenberg and Schrödinger each developed mathematically equivalent quantum theory models. Unlike the discussion on antimatter, however, the understanding was similar. Divisions between the two camps were ideological. Heisenberg’s Matrix mechanics reduced quantum phenomena to the purely “observable” (i.e. to wavelengths, and intensities of spectral lines). Schrödinger’s Wave mechanics as a description of quantum mechanics appeal to a duality in the nature of the electron. As an illustration, consider Schrödinger’s Cat Paradox, in which he considered the cat 50% alive AND 50% dead at the same time. It is the action of opening the box that collapses the probability wave.

Neglecting the philosophical issues surrounding the rationality of theory choice, we can see that Kuhn’s portrayal of science was far too simple to account for twentieth century physics. Perhaps, at best, it could only best apply to outdated traditions.

Nancy Cartwright’s Do the Laws of Physics Lie?

The current figure in the philosophy of science is Nancy Cartwright, and her view that the laws of physics are never “true”, in the sense that they are only applicable to idealized situations. She makes a distinction between scientific models and scientific theories, and claims that truth lies in a patchwork of scientific modelling. The more true a law becomes, the less explanatory it becomes because of the additional stipulations required to make it so. One of her prime examples is that of Newton’s Law of Universal Gravitation which states that the force of gravity exerted between two bodies is inversely proportional to the square of the distance between them. Nancy is at issue with the situations under which such a law is applicable: (1) the masses of the two bodies must be considered point-masses, (2) the law is limited to two bodies. Her question is simply: When does a situation like this ever exist? The more additions made to a law to make it applicable to reality, she says, the more it loses explanatory power. Consider the following models drawn from twentieth century physics:

Spacetime. Discussion on the Special Theory of Relativity introduced the speed of light, c, as a conversion factor for the measure of time: to change the units of the measure of time from seconds to meters. Now with a 4-dimensional model of the universe, visualization becomes impossible. We can devise mnemonic devices to facilitate understanding, set-up comparisons with 2-dimensional and 3-dimensional worlds, but this not the same as “understanding” or “visualizing” time as a fourth dimension. The mathematics of the model work, but conventional understanding is lost.
Wave-particle duality. This is a return to the discussion of quantum mechanics. Schrödinger’s Wave mechanics call for a probabilistic view of electrons and photons. The reality of an electron is every possible situation simultaneously, until the probability cloud is “collapsed”. This is not something that can be visualized, and so not something that is understood in a conventional sense. The implementation of the model is to facilitate computation more than understanding.

Nancy Cartwright does not appeal to the establishment of scientific laws as Popper does for the development of science. The success of science is carried out through the ‘patchwork of models.

Conclusion

Lee Smolin’s appeal to Paul Feyerabend’s philosophy that ‘anything goes’ seems like the only answer to the question of the essence of science that can account for the practice of twentieth century physics. But this is hardly satisfying. To say that there is no absolute eternal essence to science leaves the door open to include anything as science. This is crucial because, as Imre Lakatos puts it:

“The problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience has grave implications also for the institutionalization of criticism. Coopernicus’ theory was banned by the Catholic Church in 1616 because it was said to be pseudoscientific. It was taken off the index in 1820 because by that time the Church deemed that facts had proved it and therefore it became scientific. The Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party in 1949 declared Mendelian genetics pseudoscientific and had its advocates, like Academician Vavilov, killed in concentration camps; … The new liberal Establishment of the West also exercises the right to deny freedom of speech to what it regards as pseudoscience, as we have seen in the case of the debate concerning race and intelligence…The problem of demarcation between science and pseudoscience is not a pseudo-problem of armchair philosophy: it has grave ethical and political implications.”

As regards what makes science successful, this is also constantly changing. Nancy Cartwright has put forward the argument that it is a patchwork of scientific models that comprise successful scientific practice. This account is the best descriptive formulation for current practice in physics. This is not to say that there are not useful normative elements of Popper’s and Kuhn’s philosophies. In spite of Popper’s philosophy’s inadequacy in determining decisive criteria for theory choice, his Conjectures and Refutations still describes a useful methodology to theory choice and research. Thomas Kuhn’s theory advocates the validity of there being a subjective nature to theory choice.

Returning to the three ‘rival’ perspectives introduced by Peter Godfrey-Smith of what science is and what makes it successful, twentieth century physics seems to leave the answer as indeterminate. The role of experimentation in physics has developed so greatly that the image of doing arm-chair physics is incomplete. Mathematics provides models for science, it also serves as tools for science, but it does not explain an idea, and it does not develop experimental techniques. Finally, the social structure of science accounts for all of the actual activity that exists in the formal fields of science. It is hard to imagine these three being rivals because out of all of the examples taken from twentieth century physics, it appears that all three descriptions of the enterprise of science together account for its success.

//

Endnotes

Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2003. Theory and reality : An introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pg.8
Smolin, Lee. 2006. The trouble with physics : The rise of string theory, the fall of a science, and what comes next. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co. Pg. 290-295
Philosophy of science : The central issues1998. , eds. J. A. Cover, Martin Curd. 1st ed. ed. New York: Norton. Pg. 2-9
Philosophy of science : The central issues1998. , eds. J. A. Cover, Martin Curd. 1st ed. ed. New York: Norton. (Cartwright)
Philosophy of science : The central issues1998. , eds. J. A. Cover, Martin Curd. 1st ed. ed. New York: Norton. Pg. 2-9
Philosophy of science : The central issues1998. , eds. J. A. Cover, Martin Curd. 1st ed. ed. New York: Norton. Pg. 2-9
Philosophy of science : The central issues1998. , eds. J. A. Cover, Martin Curd. 1st ed. ed. New York: Norton. Pg. 10-19
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2003. Theory and reality : An introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pg.8 — Look up lakatos’ comment in godfreysmith’s book about not liking kuhn’s philo.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2003. Theory and reality : An introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pg.201
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2003. Theory and reality : An introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Pg.201
Philosophy of science : The central issues1998. , eds. J. A. Cover, Martin Curd. 1st ed. ed. New York: Norton. Pg. 26

Bibliography

Philosophy of science : The central issues1998. , eds. J. A. Cover, Martin Curd. 1st ed. ed. New York: Norton.
Bowler, Peter J. 2005. Making modern science : A historical survey, ed. Iwan Rhys Morus. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Godfrey-Smith, Peter. 2003. Theory and reality : An introduction to the philosophy of science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Greene, B. 2003. The elegant universe : Superstrings, hidden dimensions, and the quest for the ultimate theory. New York: Vintage Books.
Hawking, S. W. 1990. A brief history of time : From the big bang to black holes. New York: Bantam Books.
Lightman, AlanP. 2005. The discoveries : Great breakthroughs in twentieth-century science. 1st. Canadian ed. ed. Toronto: A.A. Knopf Canada.
Smolin, Lee. 2006. The trouble with physics : The rise of string theory, the fall of a science, and what comes next. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co.

Baby Boy, I’m missing you and I’m wonderin’ where your thoughts cross in to mine.

And honay, I see you and your mysterious eyes.

So sweet and dark a mistake when I said I had to go away…

‘Cause I love you and you don’t even know that I’m right beside you every night, and I’m thinkin’ about the times we had when we were together.

My heart is bleeding all for you.  Should I wait?

Baby boy, well the thought of you elsewhere with another girl – it breaks me into fear of losing everything in a single moment.

Did I let go and think we’d find a way to be together some day?

‘Cause I love you and you don’t even know that I’m right beside you every night, and I’m thinkin’ about the times we had when we were together.

My heart is bleeding all for you.  Should I wait?

Baby boy, I’ve been missin’ you.

Did I make a mistake when I said I had to go away, my darlin’?

Could we be together some day?

‘Cause I love you and you don’t even know that I’m right beside you every night, and I’m thinkin’ about the times we had when we were together.

My heart is bleeding all for you.  Should I wait?

Darlin’… Shh…

It is 100% a new roster as compared with the team I first fell in love with back in the 2001-02 season, but the charm is still there.

New faces mean new hope, right?

It’s ugly, we know, but even when I said I did, I never gave up hope.

It’s rebuilding time.

Dear Mr. Hitchens,

Some people got caught up in your atheism, or your pro-Iraq War sentiments, that they didn’t want to hear what you had to say.  They deprived themselves of their right to understand why you thought what you thought.  They missed the message.  They didn’t need a censor – they censored themselves.

It’s tragic.

I never repost on my blog.  However, given the magnitude of the message, I’ve done so below.

Carolyn

 

//

From http://howtoplayalone.wordpress.com/hitchens-on-free-speech/. The transcript of a speech by Christopher Hitchens from a debate at Hart House, University of Toronto, 15 November 2006. “Be It Resolved: Freedom of Speech Includes the Freedom to Hate.”

“FIRE!!! Fire… fire… fire. Now you’ve heard it. Not shouted in a crowded theatre, admittedly, as I realise I seem now to have shouted it in the Hogwarts dining room. But the point is made. Everyone knows the fatuous verdict of the greatly over-praised Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, who, asked for an actual example of when it would be proper to limit speech or define it as an action, gave that of shouting “fire” in a crowded theatre.

It’s very often forgotten what he was doing in that case was sending to prison a group of Yiddish speaking socialists, whose literature was printed in a language most Americans couldn’t read, opposing President Wilson’s participation in the First World War and the dragging of the United States into this sanguinary conflict, which the Yiddish speaking socialists had fled from Russia to escape.

In fact it could be just as plausibly argued that the Yiddish speaking socialists, who were jailed by the excellent and over-praised Judge Oliver Wendell Holmes, were the real fire fighters, were the ones shouting “fire” when there really was a fire in a very crowded theatre indeed.

And who is to decide? Well, keep that question if you would – ladies and gentlemen, brothers and sisters, I hope I may say comrades and friends – before your minds.

I exempt myself from the speaker’s kind offer of protection that was so generously proffered at the opening of this evening. Anyone who wants to say anything abusive about or to me is quite free to do so, and welcome in fact, at their own risk.

But before they do that they must have taken, as I’m sure we all should, a short refresher course on the classic texts on this matter. Which are John Milton’s Areopagitica, “Areopagitica” being the great hill of Athens for discussion and free expression. Thomas Paine’s introduction to The Age of Reason. And I would say John Stuart Mill’s essay On Liberty in which it is variously said – I’ll be very daring and summarize all three of these great gentlemen of the great tradition of, especially, English liberty, in one go.

What they say is it’s not just the right of the person who speaks to be heard, it is the right of everyone in the audience to listen, and to hear. And every time you silence someone you make yourself a prisoner of your own action because you deny yourself the right to hear something. In other words, your own right to hear and be exposed is as much involved in all these cases as is the right of the other to voice his or her view.

Indeed, as John Stuart Mill said, if all in society were agreed on the truth and beauty and value of one proposition, all except one person, it would be most important, in fact it would become even more important, that that one heretic be heard, because we would still benefit from his perhaps outrageous or appalling view.

In more modern times this has been put, I think, best by a personal heroine of mine, Rosa Luxembourg, who said freedom of speech is meaningless unless it means the freedom of the person who thinks differently.

My great friend John O’ Sullivan, former editor of the National Review, and I think probably my most conservative and reactionary Catholic friend, once said – it’s a tiny thought experiment – he says, if you hear the Pope saying he believes in God, you think, well, the Pope is doing his job again today. If you hear the Pope saying he’s really begun to doubt the existence of God, you begin to think he might be on to something.

Well, if everybody in North America is forced to attend, at school, training in sensitivity on Holocaust awareness and is taught to study the Final Solution, about which nothing was actually done by this country, or North America, or by the United Kingdom while it was going on, but let’s say as if in compensation for that everyone is made to swallow an official and unalterable story of it now, and it’s taught as the great moral exemplar, the moral equivalent of the morally lacking elements of the Second World War, a way of distilling our uneasy conscience about that combat. If that’s the case with everybody, as it more or less is, and one person gets up and says, “You know what, this Holocaust, I’m not sure it even happened. In fact, I’m pretty certain it didn’t. Indeed, I begin to wonder if the only thing is that the Jews brought a little bit of violence on themselves.” That person doesn’t just have a right to speak, that person’s right to speak must be given extra protection. Because what he has to say must have taken him some effort to come up with, might contain a grain of historical truth, might in any case get people to think about why do they know what they already think they know. How do I know that I know this, except that I’ve always been taught this and never heard anything else?

It’s always worth establishing first principle. It’s always worth saying what would you do if you met a Flat Earth Society member? Come to think of it, how can I prove the earth is round? Am I sure about the theory of evolution? I know it’s supposed to be true. Here’s someone who says there’s no such thing; it’s all intelligent design. How sure am I of my own views? Don’t take refuge in the false security of consensus, and the feeling that whatever you think you’re bound to be OK, because you’re in the safely moral majority.

One of the proudest moments of my life, that’s to say, in the recent past, has been defending the British historian David Irving who is now in prison in Austria for nothing more than the potential of uttering an unwelcome thought on Austrian soil. He didn’t actually say anything in Austria. He wasn’t even accused of saying anything. He was accused of perhaps planning to say something that violated an Austrian law that says only one version of the history of the Second World War may be taught in our brave little Tyrolean republic.

The republic that gave us Kurt Waldheim as Secretary General of the United Nations, a man wanted in several countries for war crimes. You know the country that has Jorge Haider the leader of its own fascist party in the cabinet that sent David Irving to jail.

You know the two things that have made Austria famous and given it its reputation by any chance? Just while I’ve got you. I hope there are some Austrians here to be upset by it. Well, a pity if not, but the two great achievements of Austria are to have convinced the world that Hitler was German and that Beethoven was Viennese.

Now to this proud record they can add, they have the courage finally to face their past and lock up a British historian who has committed no crime except that of thought in writing. And that’s a scandal. I can’t find a seconder usually when I propose this but I don’t care. I don’t need a seconder. My own opinion is enough for me and I claim the right to have it defended against any consensus, any majority, anywhere, any place, any time. And anyone who disagrees with this can pick a number, get in line, and kiss my ass.

Now, I don’t know how many of you, don’t feel you’re grown up enough to decide for yourselves and think you need to be protected from David Irving’s edition of the Goebbels Diaries for example, out of which I learned more about the Third Reich than I had from studying Hugh Trevor-Roper and A. J. B. Taylor combined when I was at Oxford. But for those of you who do, I’d recommend another short course of revision.

Go again and see not just the film and the play but read the text of Robert Bolt’s wonderful play A Man For All Seasons – some of you most have seen it. Where Sir Thomas More decides that he would rather die than lie or betray his faith. And one moment More is arguing with the particularly vicious witch-hunting prosecutor. A servant of the king and a hungry and ambitious man.

And More says to this man, “You’d break the law to punish the devil, wouldn’t you?”

And the prosecutor, the witch-hunter, says, “Break it?” he said, “I’d cut down, I’d cut down every law in England if I could do that, if I could capture him!”

“Yes you would, wouldn’t you? And then when you would have cornered the devil and the devil would turn around to meet you, where would you run for protection? All the laws of England having been cut down and flattened? Who would protect you then?”

Bear in mind, ladies and gentleman, that every time you violate – or propose the violate – the right to free speech of someone else, you in potentia you’re making a rod for your own back. Because the other question raised by Justice Oliver Wendall Holmes is simply this: who’s going to decide, to whom do you award the right to decide which speech is harmful, or who is the harmful speaker? Or to determine in advance what are the harmful consequences going to be that we know enough about in advance to prevent? To whom would you give this job? To whom you’re going to award the task of being the censor?

Isn’t a famous old story that the man who has to read all the pornography, in order to decide what’s fit to be passed and what is fit not to be, is the man most likely to become debauched?

Did you hear any speaker in the opposition to this motion, eloquent as one of them was, to whom you would delegate the task of deciding for you what you could read? To whom you would give the job to decide for you? Relieve you of the responsibility of hearing what you might have to hear? Do you know any one? Hands up. Do you know any one to whom you’d give this job? Does anyone have a nominee?

You mean there is no one in Canada who is good enough to decide what I can read? Or hear? I had no idea… But there’s a law that says there must be such a person – or some piddling sub-section of a law – that says it. Well to hell with that law. It is inviting you to be liars and hypocrites and to deny what you evidently already know already.

About this censorious instinct: we basically know already what we need to know, and we’ve known it for a long time, it comes from an old story about another great Englishman – sorry to sound particular about that this evening – Dr Samuel Johnson, the great lexicographer, complier of the first great dictionary of the English language. When it was complete Dr Johnson was waited upon by various delegations of people to congratulate him. Of the nobility, of equality, of the Common, of the Lords and also by a delegation of respectable ladies of London who attended on him in his Fleet Street lodgings and congratulated him.

“Dr Johnson”, they said, “We are delighted to find that you’ve not included any indecent or obscene words in your dictionary.”

“Ladies”, said Dr Johnson, “I congratulate you on being able to look them up.”

Anyone who can understand that joke – and I’m pleased to see that about 10 per cent of you can! – gets the point about censorship, especially prior restraint as it is known in the United States, where it is banned by the First Amendment to the Constitution. It may not be determined in advance what words are apt or inapt. No one has the knowledge that would be required to make that call and – more to the point – one has to suspect the motives of those who do so. In particular those who are determined to be offended, of those who will go through a treasure house of English – like Dr Johnson’s first lexicon – in search of filthy words, to satisfy themselves, and some instinct about which I dare not speculate…

Now, I am absolutely convinced that the main source of hatred in the world is religion, and organized religion. Absolutely convinced of it. And I am glad that you applaud, because it’s a very great problem for those who oppose this motion. How are they going to ban religion? How are they going to stop the expression of religious loathing, hatred and bigotry?

I speak as someone who is a very regular target of this, and not just in rhetorical form. I have been the target of many death threats, I know within a short distance of where I am currently living in Washington, I can name two or three people whose names you probably know people who can’t go anywhere now without a security detail because of the criticisms they’ve made on one monotheism in particular. And this is in the capital city of the United States.

So I know what I’m talking about, and I also have to notice, that the sort of people who ring me up and say they know where my children go to school, and they certainly know what my home number is and where I live, and what they are going to do to them and to my wife, and to me and who I have to take seriously because they already have done it to people I know, are just the people who are going to seek the protection of the hate speech law, if I say what I think about their religion, which I am now going to do.

Because I don’t have any what you might call ethnic bias, I have no grudge of that sort, I can rub along with pretty much anyone of any – as it were – origin or sexual orientation, or language group – except people from Yorkshire of course, who are completely untakable – and I’m beginning to resent the confusion that’s being imposed on us now – and there was some of it this evening – between religious belief, blasphemy, ethnicity, profanity and what one might call “multicultural etiquette”.

It’s quite common these days for people now to use the expression – for example – “anti-Islamic racism”, as if an attack on a religion was an attack on an ethnic group. The word Islamophobia in fact is beginning to acquire the opprobrium that was once reserved for racial prejudice. This is a subtle and very nasty insinuation that needs to be met head on.

Who said “what if Falwell says he hates fags? What if people act upon that?” The Bible says you have to hate fags. If Falwell says he is saying it because the Bible says so, he’s right. Yes, it might make people go out and use violence. What are you going to do about that? You’re up against a group of people who will say “you put your hands on our Bible and we’ll call the hate speech police”. Now what are you going to do when you’ve dug that trap for yourself?

Somebody said that the anti-Semitism and Kristallnacht in Germany was the result of ten years of Jew-baiting. Ten years?! You must be joking! It’s the result of 2,000 years of Christianity, based on one verse of one chapter of St. John’s Gospel, which led to a pogrom after every Easter sermon every year for hundreds of years. Because it claims that the Jews demanded the blood of Christ be on the heads of themselves and all their children to the remotest generation. That’s the warrant and license for and incitement to anti-Jewish pogroms. What are you going to do about that? Where is your piddling sub-section now?! Does it say St. John’s Gospel must be censored?!

Do I, who have read Freud and know what the future of an illusion really is and know that religious belief is ineradicable as long as we remain a stupid, poorly evolved mammalian species, think that some Canadian law is going to solve this problem? Please!

No our problem is this: our prefrontal lobes are too small. And our adrenaline glands are too big. And our thumb/ finger opposition isn’t all that it might be. And we’re afraid of the dark, and we’re afraid to die, and we believe in the truths of holy books that are so stupid and so fabricated that a child can – and all children do, as you can tell by their questions – actually see through them. And I think it should be – religion – treated with ridicule, and hatred and contempt. And I claim that right.

Now let’s not dance around, not all monotheisms are exactly the same – at the moment. They’re all based on the same illusion, they’re all plagiarisms of each other, but there is one in particular that at the moment is proposing a serious menace not just to freedom of speech and freedom of expression, but to quite a lot of other freedoms too. And this is the religion that exhibits the horrible trio of self-hatred, self-righteousness and self-pity. I am talking about militant Islam.

Globally it’s a gigantic power. It controls an enormous amount of oil wealth, several large countries and states with an enormous fortune, it’s pumping the ideology of Wahhabism and Salafism around the world, poisoning societies where it goes, ruining the minds of children, stultifying the young and its madrases, training people in violence, making a culture death and suicide and murder. That’s what it does globally, it’s quite strong.

In our society it poses as a cringing minority, who’s faith you might offend, which deserves all the protection that a small and vulnerable group might need.

Now, it makes quite large claims for itself, doesn’t it? It says it’s the final revelation. It says that god spoke to one illiterate businessman in the Arabian Peninsula three times through an archangel, and the resulting material – which as you can see when you read it – was largely plagiarized from the Old and the New Testament. Almost all of it actually plagiarised, ineptly – from the Old and the New Testament – is to be accepted as a divine revelation and as the final and unalterable one and those who do not accept this revelation are fit to be treated as cattle, infidels, potential chattel, slaves and victims.

Well I tell you what, I don’t think Mohammad ever heard those voices. I don’t believe it. And the likelihood that I’m right, as opposed to the likelihood that a businessman who couldn’t read, had bits of the Old and New Testament re-dictated to him by an archangel, I think puts me much more near the position of being objectively correct.

But who is the one under threat? The person who propagates this and says “I’d better listen because if I don’t I’m in danger”, or me who says “No, I think this is so silly you could even publish a cartoon about it”?

And up go the placards and up go the yells and the howls and the screams, “Behead those…” – this is in London, this is in Toronto and this is in New York, it is right in our midst now – “Behead those…” “Behead those who cartoon Islam”.

Do they get arrested for hate speech? No. Might I get in trouble for saying what I’ve just said about the prophet Mohammad? Yes, I might. Where are your priorities ladies and gentlemen? You’re giving away what’s most precious in your own society, and you’re giving it away without a fight and you’re even praising the people who want to deny you the right to resist it. Shame on you while you do this. Make the best use of the time you’ve got left. This is really serious.

Now, if you look anywhere you like – because we had invocations of a rather drivelling and sickly kind tonight of our sympathy – what about the poor fags, what about the poor Jews, the wretched women who can’t take the abuse and the slaves and their descendants and the tribes who didn’t make it, and where told that land was forfeit…

Look anywhere you like in the world for slavery, for the subjection of women as chattel, for the burning and flogging of homosexuals, for ethnic cleansing, for anti-Semitism, for all of this, you look no further than a famous book that’s on every pulpit in this city, and in every synagogue and in every mosque.

And then just see whether you can square the fact that the force of the main source of hatred is also the main caller for censorship. And when you’ve realized that you’re therefore this evening faced with a gigantic false antithesis, I hope that still won’t stop you from giving the motion before you the resounding endorsement that it deserves. Thanks awfully.

Night, night.

Stay cool.”

It’s that time of year when apparitions make appearances, and I’m reminded of things and people that I’ve nearly forgotten. ..well, seemingly forgotten.  Perhaps, I never really did forget.  I remember far more than I let on…

This isn’t to say that I hold any grudges, because that is far from the truth.  I just .. remember.

But through light-hearted, unguided chit-chat, my mind aimlessly stumbled upon vague recollections of things and times past.  Things and times that – dare I say it? - I had nearly forgotten!  There were fond memories of moments that I’ve long since put out of my mind.  And that’s a shame if for no other reason than because they really were happy times.  (If there’s anything I gain from my sudden recollections, it’s that for years I’d been telling myself quite the simplified version of my life.)

For too long have I been looking at my life with tunnel-vision.  But at least now I am realizing (or rather recollecting) that it was far more complex than I have given myself credit for.  The actual chronology of my life tells a different story than the one I’ve been telling myself … and others, for that matter.

There were people.  Lots of them.  There were things that happened.  Lots of those, too.  And I’ve accumulated a colourful collection of tales worth remembering.

I am who I am, and every day I remember that ever more.

I don’t like good-byes, but I wish you well.

 

The time came for me to rise above it all.

I stopped trying to explain how it was that I was reacting to something someone else did.

It didn’t matter.

Even if I could convince anyone of their role in my actions, it wouldn’t have changed anything.

It didn’t matter how anyone provoked or incited me.

It didn’t matter who was to blame.

I think it’s about .. forgiveness .. even if .. 

All that mattered was that I could face the truth afterwards -

Uncloaked and undistorted unwaveringly.

That I could look at everything that happened with no inclinations to omit anything.

No shame, no fear, no self-loathing.

No regrets, even if there were disappointments.

With open eyes and an open mind, I needed to accept it -

Not out of tiredness or frustration; neither from pressure nor indifference -

This is my life:

Coloured by people ,

Enriched through wisdom,

Tempered by experience.

That I was finally able to not only move on,

But more importantly,

To move foreward.

..

Merry Christmas, everyone!  Good luck in 2012